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Abstract—We study bottleneck congestion games where the
social cost is determined by the worst congestion of any resource.
These games directly relate to network routing problems and also
job-shop scheduling problems. In typical bottleneck congestion
games, the utility costs of the players are determined by the worst
congested resources that they use. However, the resulting Nash
equilibria are inefficient, since the price of anarchy is proportional
on the number of resources which can be high. Here we show that
we can get smaller price of anarchy with the bottleneck social
cost metric. We introduce the polynomial bottleneck games where
the utility costs of the players are polynomial functions of the
congestion of the resources that they use. In particular, the delay
function for any resource r is CMr , where Cr is the congestion
measured as the number of players that use r, and M ≥ 1 is
an integer constant that defines the degree of the polynomial.
The utility cost of a player is the sum of the individual delays
of the resources that it uses. The social cost of the game remains
the same, namely, it is the worst bottleneck resource congestion:
maxr Cr . We show that polynomial bottleneck games are very
efficient and give price of anarchy O(|R|1/(M+1)), where R is
the set of resources. This price of anarchy is tight, since we
demonstrate a game with price of anarchy Ω(|R|1/(M+1)), for
any M ≥ 1. We obtain our tight bounds by using two proof
techniques: transformation, which we use to convert arbitrary
games to simpler games, and expansion, which we use to bound
the price of anarchy in a simpler game.
I. INTRODUCTION
We consider non-cooperative congestion games with n play-
ers, where each player has a pure strategy profile from which
it selfishly selects a strategy that minimizes the player’s util-
ity cost function (such games are also known as atomic or
unsplittable-flow games). We focus on bottleneck congestion
games where the objective for the social outcome is to minimize
C, the maximum congestion on any resource. Typically, the
congestion on a resource is a non-decreasing function on the
number of players that use the resource; here, we consider the
congestion to be simply the number of players that use the
resource.
Bottleneck congestion games have been studied in the liter-
ature [1], [3], [2] in the context of routing games, where each
player’s utility cost is the worst resource congestion on its strat-
egy. For any resource r, we denote by Cr the number of users
that use r in their strategies. In typical bottleneck congestion
games, each player i has utility cost functionCi = maxr∈Si Cr,
where Si is the strategy of the player. The social cost is worst
congested resource: C = maxiCi = maxr Cr.
In [1] the authors observe that bottleneck games are impor-
tant in networks for various practical reasons. In networks, each
resource corresponds to a network link, each player corresponds
to a packet, and a strategy represents a path for the packet. In
wireless networks, the maximum congested link is related to
the lifetime of the network since the nodes adjacent to high
congestion links transmit large number of packets which results
to higher energy utilization. High congestion links also result
to congestion hot-spots which may slow-down the network
throughput. Hot spots also increase the vulnerability of the
network to malicious attacks which aim to to increase the
congestion of links in the hope to bring down the network.
Thus, minimizing the maximum congested edge results to hot-
spot avoidance and more load-balanced and secure networks.
In networks, bottleneck games are also important from a
theoretical point of view since the maximum resource conges-
tion is immediately related to the optimal packet scheduling.
In a seminal result, Leighton et al. [13] showed that there
exist packet scheduling algorithms that can deliver the packets
along their chosen paths in time very close to C +D, where
D is the maximum chosen path length. When C ≫ D,
the congestion becomes the dominant factor in the packet
scheduling performance. Thus, smaller C immediately implies
faster packet delivery time.
A natural problem that arises in games concerns the effect
of the players’ selfishness on the welfare of the whole system
measured with the social cost C. We examine the consequence
of the selfish behavior in pure Nash equilibria which are stable
states of the game in which no player can unilaterally improve
her situation. We quantify the effect of selfishness with the
price of anarchy (PoA) [12], [18], which expresses how much
larger is the worst social cost in a Nash equilibrium compared
to the social cost in the optimal coordinated solution. The price
of anarchy provides a measure for estimating how closely do
Nash equilibria of bottleneck congestion games approximate
the optimal C∗ of the respective coordinated optimization
problem.
Ideally, the price of anarchy should be small. However,
the current literature results have only provided weak bounds
2for bottleneck games. In [1] it is shown that if the resource
congestion delay function is bounded by some polynomial with
degree k (with respect to the packets that use the resource) then
PoA = O(|R|k), where R is the set of links (resources) in the
graph. In [3] the authors consider bottleneck routing games for
the case k = 1 and they show that PoA = O(L + log |V |),
where L is the maximum path length (maximum number of
resources) in the players’ strategies and V is the set of nodes
in the network. This bound is asymptotically tight (within poly-
log factors) since it is shown in [3] that there are game instances
with PoA = Ω(L). Since L = |R|, the price of anarchy has to
be large, PoA = Ω(|R|).
A. Contributions
The lower bound in [3] suggests that in order to obtain better
price of anarchy in bottleneck congestion games (where the
social cost is the bottleneck resource C), we need to consider
alternative player utility cost functions. Towards this goal, we
introduce polynomial bottleneck games where the player cost
functions are polynomial expressions of the congestions along
the resources. In particular, the player utility cost function for
player i is: C′i =
∑
r∈Si
CMr , for some integer constant M≥
1. Note that the new utility cost is a sum of polynomial terms on
the congestion of the resources in the chosen strategy (instead
of the max that we described earlier). The social cost remains
the maximum bottleneck congestion C, the same as in typical
congestion games.
The new player utility costs have significant benefits in
improving both the upper and lower bounds on the price of
anarchy. For the bottleneck social cost C we prove that the
price of anarchy of polynomial games is:
PoA = O(|R|1/(M+1)),
for any constant M≥ 1. We show that this bound is asymptot-
ically tight by providing an instance of a polynomial bottleneck
game with PoA = Ω(|R|1/(M+1)), for any constant M ≥ 1.
Our price of anarchy bound is a significant improvement
over the price of anarchy from the typical bottleneck games
described above.
Polynomial congestion games are interesting variations of
bottleneck games not only because they provide good price
of anarchy but also because they represent interesting and
important real-life problems. In networks, the overall delay
that a packet experiences is directly related with the link
congestions along the path and hence the polynomial utility
cost function reflects the total delivery delay. In wireless
networks, the polynomial player utilities correspond to the total
energy that a packet consumes while it traverses the network,
and the social cost reflects to the worst energy utilization in
any node in the network. Similar benefits from polynomial
congestion games appear in the context of job-shop scheduling,
where computational tasks require resources to execute. In this
context, the social bottleneck cost function C represents the
task load-balancing efficiency of the resources, and the player
utility costs relate to the makespan of the task schedule. In
all the above problems, the polynomial degree M is chosen
appropriately to model precisely the involved costs of the
resource utilization in each computational environment.
In our analysis, we obtain the price of anarchy upper bound
by using two techniques: transformation and expansion. Con-
sider a game G with a Nash equilibrium S and congestion
C. We identify two kinds of players in S: type-A players
which use only one resource in their strategies, and type-B
players which use two or more resources. In our first technique,
transformation, we convert G to a simpler game G˜, having a
Nash equilibrium S˜ with congestion C˜ , such that C˜ = O(C),
and all players in S˜ with congestion above a threshold τ are of
type-A; that is, we transform type-B players to type-A players.
Having type-A players is easier to bound the price of anarchy.
Then, we use a second technique, expansion, which is used to
give an upper bound on the price of anarchy of game G˜, which
implies an upper bound on the price of anarchy of the original
game G.
In [10], we have derived upper bounds for the price of
anarchy of games with exponential utility cost functions using
similar techniques (transformation and expansion). While ex-
ponential cost games have a unique substructure which makes
the analysis of Price of Anarchy much simpler, we believe
these techniques are general enough to adapt in a non-trivial
manner for a large class of utility cost functions. For the case
of exponential cost games, we obtained logarithmic price of
anarchy upper bounds, which was related to the problem struc-
ture. Here we obtain tight (optimal) price of anarchy bounds
for polynomial bottleneck games using a non-trivial application
of the general transformation and expansion techniques.
B. Related Work
Congestion games were introduced and studied in [17],
[19]. In [19], Rosenthal proves that congestion games have
always pure Nash equilibria. Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
[12] introduced the notion of price of anarchy in the specific
parallel link networks model in which they provide the bound
PoA = 3/2. Roughgarden and Tardos [22] provided the first
result for splittable flows in general networks in which they
showed that PoA ≤ 4/3 for a player cost which reflects to the
sum of congestions of the resources of a path. Pure equilibria
with atomic flow have been studied in [3], [4], [14], [24] (our
work fits into this category), and with splittable flow in [20],
[21], [22], [23]. Mixed equilibria with atomic flow have been
studied in [6], [8], [11], [12], [15], [16], [18], and with splittable
flow in [5], [7].
Most of the work in the literature uses a cost metric related to
the sum of congestions of all the resources of the player’s path
[4], [21], [22], [23], [24]. In terms of our notation, the player
cost functions are polynomials of degree M = 1. However,
the social cost in those games is different than ours since it
is an aggregate function of the player flows and congestion
of all the resources. On the other hand, the social cost in our
3case corresponds to the bottleneck congestion which is a metric
that reduces to a single resource. The vast majority of the
work on congestion games has been performed for parallel link
networks, with only a few exceptions on network topologies
[3], [4], [5], [20]. Our work immediately applies to network
topologies.
In [3], the authors consider bottleneck routing games in
networks with player cost Ci and social cost C. They prove
that the price of stability is 1 (the price of stability measures
the ratio of the best Nash equilibrium social cost versus the
coordinated optimal solution). They show that the price of
anarchy is bounded byO(L+log |V |), where L is the maximum
allowed path length, and V is the set of nodes. They also
prove that κ ≤ PoA ≤ c(κ2 + log2|V |), where κ is the size
of the largest resource-simple cycle in the graph and c is a
constant. That work was extended in [2] to the C +D routing
problem. Bottleneck routing games have also been studied
in [1], where the authors consider the maximum congestion
metric in general networks with splittable and atomic flow (but
without considering path lengths). They prove the existence and
non-uniqueness of equilibria in both the splittable and atomic
flow models. They show that finding the best Nash equilibrium
that minimizes the social cost is a NP-hard problem. Further,
they show that the price of anarchy may be unbounded for
specific resource congestion functions. In [9], the authors prove
the existence of strong Nash equilibria (which concern coali-
tions of players) for games with the lexicographic improvement
property; such games include Bottleneck congestion games and
our polynomial games.
Outline of Paper
In Section II we give basic definitions. In Section III we
convert games with type-B players to games with type-A
players. In Section IV we give a bound on the price of anarchy.
We finish with providing a lower bound in Section V.
II. DEFINITIONS
A congestion game is a strategic game G =
(ΠG, R, S, (dr)r∈R, (pcpi)pi∈ΠG) where:
• ΠG = {pi1, . . . , pin} is a non-empty and finite set of
players.
• R = {r1, . . . , rz} is a non-empty and finite set of
resources.
• S = Spi1 × Spi2 × · · · × Spin , where Spii is a strategy set
for player pii, such that Spii ⊆ powerset(R); namely,
each strategy Spii ∈ Spii is pure, and it is a collection
of resources. A game state (or pure strategy profile) is
any S ∈ S. We consider finite games which have finite S
(finite number of states).
• In any game state S, each resource r ∈ R has a delay cost
denoted dr(S).
• In any game state S, each player pi ∈ ΠG has a player
cost pcpi(S) =
∑
r∈Spi
dr(S).
Consider a game G with a state S = (Spi1 , . . . , Spin). The
(congestion) of a resource r is defined as Cr(S) = |{pii : r ∈
Spii}|, which is the number of players that use r in state S.
The (bottleneck) congestion of a set of resources Q ⊆ R is
defined as CQ(S) = maxr∈QCr(S), which is the maximum
congestion over all resources in Q. The (bottleneck) congestion
of state S is denoted C(S) = CR(S), which is the maximum
congestion over all resources in R. The length of state S
is defined to be L(S) = maxi |Spii |, namely, the maximum
number of resources used in any player. When the context
is clear, we will drop the dependence on S. We examine
polynomial congestion games:
• Polynomial games: The delay cost function for any re-
source r is dr = CMr , for some integer constant M≥ 1.
For any state S, we use the standard notation S =
(Spii , S−pii) to emphasize the dependence on player pii. Player
pii is locally optimal (or stable) in state S if pcpii(S) ≤
pcpii((S
′
pii , S−pii , )) for all strategies S
′
pii ∈ Spii . A greedy move
by a player pii is any change of its strategy from S′pii to Spii
which improves the player’s cost, that is, pcpii((Spii , S−pii)) <
pcpii((S
′
pii , S−pii)). Best response dynamics are sequences of
greedy moves by players. A state S is in a Nash Equilibrium
if every player is locally optimal. Nash Equilibria quantify the
notion of a stable selfish outcome. In the games that we study
there could exist multiple Nash Equilibria.
For any game G and state S, we will consider a social
cost (or global cost) which is simply the bottleneck congestion
C(S). A state S∗ is called optimal if it has minimum attainable
social cost: for any other state S, C(S∗) ≤ C(S). We will
denote C∗ = C(S∗). We quantify the quality of the states
which are Nash Equilibria with the price of anarchy (PoA)
(sometimes referred to as the coordination ratio). Let P denote
the set of distinct Nash Equilibria. Then the price of anarchy
of game G is:
PoA(G) = sup
S∈ P
C(S)
C∗
,
We continue with some more special definitions that we use
in the proofs. Consider a game G with a socially optimal state
S∗ = (S∗pi1 , . . . , S
∗
pin), and let S = (Spi1 , . . . , Spin) denote the
equilibrium state. We consider two special kinds of players with
respect to states S and S∗:
• Type-A players: any player pii with |Spii | = 1.
• Type-B players: any player pii with |Spii | ≥ 2.
For any resource r ∈ R, we will let Πr and Π∗r denote the
set of players with r in their equilibrium and socially optimal
strategies respectively, i.e Πr = {pii ∈ ΠG|r ∈ Spii} and Π∗r =
{pii ∈ ΠG|r ∈ S∗pii}.
Let G = (ΠG, R, S, d, (pcpi)pi∈ΠG) and G˜ =
(ΠG˜, R˜, S˜, d˜, (p˜cpi)pi∈ΠG˜) be two games. We say that G
dominates G˜ if the following conditions hold between them
for the highest cost Nash equilibrium and optimal states and
: |R˜| ≤ |R|, d = d˜, C˜ = C, C∗ ≤ C˜∗ ≤ βC∗, where β > 1
is a constant and C,C∗ and C˜, C˜∗ represent the bottleneck
4congestions in the highest cost Nash equilibrium and optimal
states of G and G˜, respectively.
Corollary 2.1: PoA(G) ≤ β ·PoA(G˜) for an arbitrary game
G and dominated game G˜.
In the next section, we will describe how an arbitrary game
G in Nash equilibrium state S can be transformed into a
dominated game G˜ containing type A players of arbitrary cost
and type B players restricted to costs below a given threshold.
III. TYPE-B TO TYPE-A GAME TRANSFORMATION
We first state our main results in this section.
Theorem 3.1: Every game G with highest-cost Nash equi-
librium state S can be transformed into a game G˜ with Nash
equilibrium state S˜ in which all resources r with congestion
Cr > ψ = max(2M, 3C∗) are occupied exclusively by type-A
players.
Theorem 3.2: G˜ is dominated by G, i.e the bottleneck con-
gestion in optimal states S∗ and S˜∗ of G and G˜ satisfies
C∗ ≤ C˜∗ ≤ 7C∗.
We prove Theorem 3.1 by constructing G˜ via the transfor-
mation algorithm below and defer the proof of the domination
of G˜ for later. We first describe some needed preliminaries.
Preliminaries: We initialize G˜, the input to our transforma-
tion algorithm as a restricted version of game G with exactly
two strategies per player: S˜pi = Spi and S˜∗pi = S∗pi. We iteratively
transform G˜ by converting type-B players of cost at least
T = ψM + 1 into type-A players, one at a time in decreasing
order of player costs until all type-B players remaining either
fall below the threshold cost function T or no type-B players
exist. We add and delete players/resources from G˜ iteratively
and have a working set of players. However G˜ will always
remain in equilibrium state S˜ at every step of the transformation
process. When we add a new player pik to Π˜ we will assign
two strategy sets to pik: an ‘equilibrium’ strategy S˜pik and an
optimal strategy S˜∗pik . Thus S˜ = S˜
⋃
S˜pik and S˜∗ = S˜∗
⋃
S˜∗pik .
We then convert G˜ into a ‘clean’ version in which every
type-B player pi ∈ Π˜ has distinct resources in its equilibrium
and optimal strategies i.e S˜pi
⋂
S˜∗pi = ∅. If not already true, this
can be achieved by creating |S˜pi
⋂
S˜∗pi| new type-A players with
identical and one type-B player with disjoint equilibrium and
optimal strategies for each original player pi. The new type-
B player has S˜pi − S˜∗pi and S˜∗pi − S˜pi as its equilibrium and
optimal strategy respectively while the new type-A players each
use one resource from |S˜pi
⋂
S˜∗pi| as their identical equilibrium
and optimal strategies. Note that the new players are also
in equilibrium in S˜. We also assume throughout that type-
A players in G˜ have no redundant resources in their optimal
strategies, i.e if a resource can be removed from S˜∗pi without
affecting pcpi(S˜pi) ≤ pcpi(S˜∗pi), then it is removed.
Let pii be an arbitrary type-B-player using k resources
r1, r2, . . . , rk in its equilibrium strategy S˜pii that are distinct
from the m resources r∗1 , . . . , r∗m in its optimal strategy S˜∗pii .
Let Crj , Cr∗j denote the congestion on these resources in
equilibrium state S˜. Define procedure PMS−Partition(pii)
as follows:
Procedure 1: Partition S˜pii and S˜∗pii into t pairs
(L1, L
∗
1), (L2, L
∗
2), . . . , (Lt, L
∗
t ) where
1) The Lj’s form a disjoint resource partition of S˜pii .
2) L∗j ⊆ S˜∗pii and |L∗j
⋂
L∗k| ≤ 1, for 1 ≤ j, k ≤ t.
3) ∑
r∈L∗
j
(Cr + 1)
M ≥
∑
r∈Lj
CMr , 1 ≤ j ≤ t (1)
Without loss of generality, assume the resources in S˜pii have
been sorted in decreasing order of congestion and vice versa
for resources in S˜∗pii , i.e Cr1 ≥ Cr2 . . . ≥ . . . Crm and Cr∗1 ≤
Cr∗
2
. . . ≤ . . . Cr∗m . Then we have the following:
Lemma 3.3: There exists an implementation of
PMS−Partition(pii) in which
1) The L∗j ’s, 1 ≤ j ≤ t, form a linear partition of
S˜∗pii into contigous resources with |L∗j
⋂
L∗j+1| ≤ 1. If
|L∗j
⋂
L∗j+1| = 1 then the last resource in L∗j is the first
resource in L∗j+1.
2) ∀j : 1 ≤ j ≤ t, either |Lj | = 1 or |L∗j | = 1 or both. If
|Lj| > 1 and |L∗j | = 1 with L∗j = {r∗p} we must have
Cr∗p ≥ max{Cr|r ∈ Lj}.
Proof: We provide a simple proof sketch due to space
limitations. Start with L1 = {r1}. We add resources r∗1 , . . . , r∗q
to L∗1 where r∗q is the first resource such that
∑q
j=1(Cr∗j +
1)M ≥ CMr1 . Then we proceed with L2 = {r2} and start
forming L∗2 with r∗q . As we continue this process, due to the
fact that
m∑
j=1
(Cr∗
j
+ 1)M ≥
k∑
l=1
CMrl , (2)
eventually resources in L will have smaller congestion than
the resources in L∗. At this point the L∗ partitions will
contain single resources while the corresponding L partition
will contain multiple resources. At each step, we maintain
the invariant in Equation 1, which implies condition 2 in the
lemma. No resource in L∗j need be used more than twice during
this process, which is assured because of Eq. 2. We skip the
remaining technical details of the proof which ensure that as
many resources as possible from S˜∗pii are used in the partition-
pairs.
Procedure PMS−Partition() is used to create new players
and forms the basic step in our transformation algorithm. We
ensure the equilibrium of these new players in G˜ using the key
constructs of exact matching sets and potential matching sets.
A set of resources R˜ in G˜ forms an exact matching set for
a newly created player pik with newly assigned equilibrium
strategy S˜pik if
∑
r∈R˜(Cr + 1)
M ≥ pcpik(S˜pik , S˜−pik) =∑
r∈S˜pik
CMr . Clearly, R˜ can be assigned as the new optimal
strategy S˜∗pik in game G˜ without violating the equilibrium of
pik.
5Potential matching sets are defined for newly created type-B
players. A potential matching set R˜ is an exact matching set
that can ‘potentially’ be added to the optimal set of resources
S˜∗pik of a type-B player pik ∈ G˜ without increasing the optimal
bottleneck congestion in G˜ from original game G by a constant
factor i.e C˜∗ ≤ βC∗, where β > 1 is a constant.
Now consider a type-B player pii to be transformed. We
partition the resources in its equilibrium and optimal strategies
S˜pii and S˜∗pii according to PMS−Partition(pii) and remove it
from G˜, i.e S˜ = S˜ − S˜pii and S˜∗ = S˜∗ − S˜∗pii .
Consider those partition-pairs (Lj, L∗j ) with |Lj | = 1. We
can create a new type-A player pik and add it to to G˜ with an
equilibrium strategy S˜pik that is the singleton resource in Lj .
Due to the condition in Eq. 1, the set of resources in L∗j forms
an exact matching set for pik and can therefore be assigned to
S˜∗pik . pik is in equilibrium in G˜ and the equilibrium and optimal
congestion on resources in S˜pik and S˜∗pik are now the same as
before. This forms the ‘easy’ part of the transformation process.
Consider however, those partitions (Lj , L∗j) with 1 < |Lj| ≤
|R| and L∗j = {r∗l }. Similar to the above, we can create |Lj|
new type-A players and assign a distinct resource in Lj to
each such players equilibrium strategy. However if, as above,
we assign r∗l , the single resource in L∗j , to each players optimal
strategy, we might increase the socially optimal congestion C˜∗
of G˜ to as much as C∗+ |R|, thereby violating the domination
of G over G˜. Thus we need to find an appropriate potential
matching set from among existing resources and assign them
to these players, without increasing the optimal congestion
beyond O(C∗). Finding such a set is the ‘hard’ part of the
transformation process and forms the core of our algorithm
below.
We define a subroutine (PARTITION-TRANSFORM)that
executes procedure PMS−Partition(pii) for a type-B player
pii and creates several new type-A and type-B play-
ers. Specifically, we first obtain PMS−Partition(pii) =
(L1, L
∗
1), . . . , (Lt, L
∗
t ). We then delete the strategies of pii from
G˜ and transform pii into t new type-A and type-B sub-players
as follows:. for each partition member Lq, we create a new
player piLq which is either a type-A player if |Lq| = 1, or a
type-B player if |Lq| > 1, 1 ≤ q ≤ t. piLq is created with
two strategy sets: equilibrium strategy S˜piLq = Lq and socially
optimal strategy S˜∗piLq = L
∗
q .
The following lemma is a direct consequence of lemma 3.3
and is needed for later analysis.
Lemma 3.4: For a given type-B player pii, every new
type-B player piLq created after an execution of subroutine
PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pii) is in equilibrium in G˜ with
pcpiLq ≤ (Cp + 1)M ≤ pcpii , where Cp = maxCr|r ∈ S˜∗pii .
Every new type-A player piq is also in equilibrium with
pcpiLq ≤ pcpii .
We are now ready to prove our main result.
Proof of Theorem 3.1: We describe the transformation via an
iterative algorithm for which the pseudocode is attached below.
The main challenge is to find potential matching sets for newly
created type-B players without increasing the optimal conges-
tion in the game beyond a constant factor. To achieve this, we
will transform type-B players in distinct phases corresponding
to decreasing ranges of player costs. As a preprocessing step
in the algorithm we call PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pi) for all
type-B players pi with pcpi > (C + 1)M. By lemma 3.4, we
are now left only with players with cost ≤ (C + 1)M in G˜.
Algorithm 1 TRANSFORMATION ALGORITHM
1: Preprocessing:
2: ∀ Type-B players pi with pcpi > (C + 1)M
3: Execute PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pi)
4: Main Procedure
5: for i = 1 to C + 1− ψ do
6: Phase Index Ĉ = C + 1− i
7: ΠĈ ← {type-Bpij ∈ Π˜|ĈM < pcpij(S˜pij ) ≤ (Ĉ + 1)M}
8: for all pil ∈ ΠĈ do
9: PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pil)
10: end for
11: ΠĈ ← {type-Bpij ∈ Π˜|ĈM < pcpij(S˜pij ) ≤ (Ĉ + 1)M}
12: ΠĈ ← ΠĈ
⋃{type-A players with cost = ĈM
13: for all pil ∈ ΠĈ do
14: ELIMINATE-HIGH-CONGESTION-
RESOURCES(pil)
15: end for
16: D ← {pil} where 1)|S˜∗pil | > 1, 2)maxr∈S˜∗pil{Cr} ≤ Ĉ−1
17: and 3) ∑r∈S˜∗pil (Cr + 1)M ≥ (Ĉ + 1)M
18: for all pil ∈ D do
19: PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pil)
20: end for
21: E ← {pil} where |S˜∗pil | = 1 and CS˜∗pil = Ĉ
22: X ← {r ∈ R|Cr = Ĉ}
23: while |E| > 0 do
24: Choose any pil ∈ E and select UNMARKED
25: type-A player pij ∈ ΠX in round-robin fashion.
26: Update S˜∗pil ← S˜∗pil
⋃
S˜∗pij
27: Update S˜∗pij ← S˜pij and MARK pij
28: PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pil) and add the resultant
new player to E if qualified
29: end while
30: end for
Let Ĉ = C+1−i denote a (decreasing) phase index. During
the ith phase, 1 ≤ i ≤ C + 1 − ψ, we transform all type-B
players with player costs ĈM < pcpi ≤ (Ĉ + 1)M into either
type-A players or type-B players of cost ≤ ĈM. We will use
the fact that in phase i, all resources with congestion ≥ Ĉ+1 in
equilibrium state S˜ are occupied only by type-A players (since
any type-B player using a resource r with Cr ≥ Ĉ + 1 would
6have a player cost strictly > (Ĉ + 1)M, a contradiction).
In phase i, let ΠĈ denote the set of type-B players pij whose
player costs are in the range ĈM < pcpij ≤ (Ĉ + 1)M. We
first call on PARTITION-TRANSFORM for all players in ΠĈ .
This results in a new set of type-A and type-B players with
the same or lower player costs. New type-B players with cost
≤ ĈM, are dealt with in subsequent phases while we form ΠĈ
again with the remaining type-B players. At this point, every
type-B player pil ∈ ΠĈ has exactly one resource in its optimal
strategy (by definition of lemma 3.3). Moreover, this resource
must have congestion Cr ≥ Ĉ in equilibrium state S˜, since
pcpil(S˜) > Ĉ
M
.
As discussed before, the key challenge is to find a larger
potential matching set for such type-B players without increas-
ing C˜∗ significantly. For technical reasons, we first eliminate
all high-congested resources from consideration as potential
matching sets. In particular, resources with equilibrium con-
gestion Cr ≥ Ĉ + 1 are occupied only by type-A players.
By eliminating these resources (using subroutine ELIMINATE-
HIGH-CONGESTION-RESOURCES(pil) described below), we
ensure that the optimal congestion C˜∗r on any resource r with
equilibrium congestion Cr remains unchanged during all phases
with phase index Ĉ < Cr.
Let pil denote a generic player from the set of type-B players
in ΠĈ and the set of type-A players in G˜ with player cost
exactly ĈM and a single resource in their optimal strategy
sets. Let S˜∗pil = {x}. We check to see if Cx ≥ Ĉ + 1. If
so, we find the type-A player piq ∈ Πx (recall that Πx is the
set of players using x in equilibrium) with the largest socially
optimal strategy set |S˜∗piq |. Let F = argminCr≥Ĉ{r ∈ S˜∗piq},
i.e the resource in S˜∗piq with the smallest congestion ≥ Ĉ. If
F above does not exist, then set F = S˜∗piq . We now change
the socially optimal strategy of pil to F instead of x. Since∑
y∈F (Cy + 1)
M ≥ (Ĉ + 1)M ≥ pcpil , we are assured that
pil will remain in equilibrium in S˜ after this. Simultaneously,
change the optimal strategy of piq to its equilibrium strategy
i.e S˜∗piq = S˜piq = x. Note that after this step, the equilibrium
and optimal congestion on all resources involved, i.e x and F ,
remain unchanged in G˜. If the resource x above has congestion
Cx > Ĉ, we repeat the steps for player pil. We execute the
subroutine for all such qualified players.
It must now be the case that the set of players {pil} can
be divided into two subsets D and E, where D contains all
the players with |S˜∗pil | > 1, maxr∈S˜∗pil{Cr} ≤ Ĉ − 1 and∑
r∈S˜∗pil
(Cr+1)
M ≥ (Ĉ+1)M while E contains players with
|S˜∗pil | = 1 and Cy = Ĉ , where S˜∗pil = {y}. We now execute
PARTITION-TRANSFORM on all type-B players in the set
D. By lemma 3.3, the cost of a newly created type-B player
after PARTITION-TRANSFORM on the set D can be at most
ĈM. These players will be further transformed in subsequent
phases.
It now only remains to transform type-B players from the
set E in this phase. Let X = {r ∈ R|Cr = Ĉ} denote the set
of resources with congestion exactly Ĉ in equilibrium. Let ΠX
denote the set of players using resources fromX in equilibrium.
From the above discussions, we note the following:
1) Every type-B and type-A player pil ∈ E is using a
resource from X in its optimal strategy, i.e S˜∗pil = x for
some x ∈ X .
2) Every type-A player in D⋃E is using a resource from
X in its equilibrium strategy.
Essentially every untransformed type-B player is using a
resource in X in its optimal strategy. Let XB ⊆ E denote
the set of type-B players in ΠX . Then XA = ΠX −XB, the
remaining set of players in ΠX , must be of type-A. We can
focus on the set XA to obtain larger potential matching sets
for type-B players in E.
Order the resources in X as L = r1, r2, . . . rk , in increasing
order of number of type-A players using them in equilibrium,
where k ≤ |X |. For each type-B player pil ∈ E, we select
an unmarked type-A player pij using a resource, say rm
in L, (i.e S˜pij = rm) where S˜∗pij
⋂
S˜∗pil = ∅. Now define
PMS(pil) = S˜
∗
pij
⋃
S˜∗pil as the new potential matching set for
pil. Update the optimal strategy of pil to S˜∗pil = PMS(pil)
and execute PARTITION-TRANSFORM(pil). We claim that
at least two new players are created, at most one of which
could be a type-B player with cost > ĈM. This is because∑
r∈S˜∗pij
(Cr + 1)
M ≥ ĈM while every resource in S˜pil has
congestion ≤ Ĉ. Thus resources from S˜∗pij will be in at least
one partition pair of PMS−Partition(pil) while the (existing)
resource in S˜∗pil will be in another partition pair. If after
PMS−Partition(pil) there is still a type-B player with cost
> ĈM add this player to the set E. Simultaneously update the
optimal strategy of pij to S˜∗pij = rm and mark pij . (Note that
this increases the optimal congestion on rm by one. We will
bound the total increase in optimal congestion later). Also note
that all players are in equilibrium in S˜. We repeat the process
as long as there exist type-B players in set E.
In order to show that this is a valid transformation, we need
to show that there exist a sufficient number of unmarked type-
A players in X . We do this by a simple counting argument.
Let α = ⌊eMψ ⌋. First note that each type-B player in XB
can be using at most ⌊(Ĉ + 1)M/ĈM⌋ ≤ α resources in X
in equilibrium state S˜ and hence |XA| ≥ |X | · Ĉ − α|XB|.
Secondly, since each resource in X can be in the optimal
strategy of at most C∗ type-B players and every type-B player
in E at the start of the transformation process has its optimal
strategy in X , we must have |XB| ≤ C∗|X |. Finally, noting
that each type-B player in E at the start of the transformation
process can make at most 2α calls for marking type-A players
before it is completely transformed we get the total number
of type-A players in X required for marking as ≤ 2αC∗|X |.
Using the given threshold value ψ = max(2M, 3C∗), we
7obtain the number of type-A players in X as
|XA| ≥ |X | · Ĉ − |XB| ≥ |X |(Ĉ − C∗) ≥ 2C∗|X | (3)
for Ĉ > ψ ≥ 3C∗ which proves the result. ✷
Proof of Theorem 3.2: First note that the optimal congestion
C˜∗r on a resource r does not change in any phase with phase
index Ĉ < Cr . There are only two occasions when C˜∗r
increases:
1) During the phase with index Ĉ = Cr, C˜∗r increases
by one whenever a type-A player on r is marked. The
number of resources in X that contain type-A players
to be marked is |RA| ≥ |XA|/Ĉ ≥ |X | (Ĉ−C∗)
Ĉ
. In
order to bound the increase in C˜∗r , we will select (and
mark) type-A players from RA during each step of the
transformation in cyclic round-robin fashion, i.e after
marking rm, we select a type-A player from rm+1 etc.
Since at most 2C∗|X | players are required to be marked,
the maximum number of marked players on any resource
in X is ≤ 2C∗|X |/|RA| which is bounded by
2ĈC∗
Ĉ − C∗ ≤
2ψC∗
ψ − C∗ ≤ 3C
∗
Hence for any resource r optimal congestion C˜∗r increases
by at most 3C∗ in phase index Cr due to marked players.
2) At the beginning of the transformation process, r can
be in the optimal strategy set, and consequently partition
pairs of up to C∗ players. In the discussion below, focus
on a particular player in this set and consider the increase
in C˜∗r throughout the transformation process only due
to r’s presence in some partition pair L∗k due to this
particular player. r via L∗k can be involved in multiple
calls to PMS−Partition() in multiple phases with phase
index > Cr. In any such call to PMS−Partition(), C˜∗r
can increase by 1 only if r is either the first or last
resource in a new partition pair L∗j ⊂ L∗k. Once r is the
first or last resource in a partition L∗j , its C˜∗r can increase
by at most one when r become part of a new singleton
partition pair (i.e L∗k = {r}). From this point onwards,
C˜∗r cannot increase due to further PMS−Partition()
calls. Thus the total increase in C˜∗r is bounded by 3.
Given that r can be in up to C∗ optimal strategy sets at
the start of the first phase, the total increase in C˜∗r due
to calls to PMS−Partition() is bounded by 3C∗.
Putting the two facts above together, consequently, we get
C˜∗ ≤ C∗ + 3C∗ + 3C∗ = 7C∗ and hence G˜ is dominated by
G. ✷
IV. PRICE OF ANARCHY
A. Price of Anarchy for Type-A Player Games
We now consider equilibria where highly congested re-
sources are occupied only by type-A players and use this
to bound the price of anarchy of games with polynomial
cost functions. Consider a game with optimal solution S∗ =
(S∗pi1 , . . . , S
∗
pin) and congestion C
∗
. Let ψ = max(2M, 3C∗)
be a threshold value. Let S = (Spi1 , . . . , Spin) denote the Nash
equilibrium state which has the highest congestion C among
all Nash equilibria states, and further all players on resources r
with Cr > ψ are of type-A. We will obtain a price of anarchy
result by bounding the ratio C/C∗.
We first define a resource graph N for state S. There are
V = V1
⋃
V2 nodes in N . Each resource r ∈ R with Cr > ψ
(Cr ≤ ψ, resp.) corresponds to the equivalent node r ∈ V1
(r ∈ V2). Henceforth we will use the term resource and node
interchangeably. For every player pi using a resource x ∈ V1 in
equilibrium, there is a directed edge (x, y) between node x and
all nodes y ∈ V , where y 6= x is in the optimal strategy set of
pi i.e Spi = x and y ∈ S∗pi. The set of nodes in
⋃
pi:Spi=x
S∗pi are
called the children of node x. We use the notation Ch(x) to
denote this set. Note that there could be multiple links directed
at x from the same node, however x can be the child of at most
C∗ nodes and x cannot be its own child. Also note that nodes
in V2 are terminal nodes that have no outgoing links.
We first observe the following about nodes in V1:
Lemma 4.1: For any node x ∈ N with Cx > ψ, it holds
that ∑
y∈Ch(x)
⋂
V1
CMy +
∑
y∈Ch(x)
⋂
V2
ψM ≥ Cx − C
∗
2C∗
CMx
Proof: Let Π be the set of players such that ∀pi ∈ Π :
Spi = x and x 6∈ S∗pi. We must have Cx−C∗ ≤ |Π| ≤ Cx since
up to C∗ players could be using resource x simultaneously in
their optimal as well as equilibrium strategies. Since pi is in
equilibrium state, we must have
∑
y∈S∗pi
(Cy + 1)
M ≥ CMx .
Let Zpi = S∗pi
⋂
V1 and Wpi = S∗pi
⋂
V2. Using the fact that
∀z ∈ Zpi : Cz > ψ and C∗ ≥ 1, we get that ((Cz+1)/Cz)M ≤
(1 + 1ψ )
M ≤ √e < 2. Also ∀w ∈ W : Cw + 1 ≤ ψ + 1 < 2ψ
and hence
∑
z∈Zpi
2(Cz)
M +
∑
w∈Wpi
2ψM ≥ CMx /2. Now
consider the sum∑
pi∈Π
(∑
z∈Zpi
CMz +
∑
w∈Wpi
ψM
)
Since |Π| ≥ Cx −C∗ and each resource z and w in the inside
term above can be in the sets Zpi and Wpi for up to C∗ players
from Π, we get∑
y∈Ch(x)
⋂
V1
CMy +
∑
y∈Ch(x)
⋂
V2
ψM ≥ Cx − C
∗
2C∗
CMx (4)
as desired.
To get a bound on the price of anarchy we need to relate
the number of resources |R| with the parameters C and C∗.
Note that the second term on the LHS of Eq. 4 is bounded by
|R|ψM . Unfortunately, since N has cycles, we cannot apply
the lemma recursively to nodes from the first term on the LHS
and their children in N (to eventually replace these nodes with
8nodes from V2). We will therefore modifyN to eliminate cycles
and construct an expansion Directed Acyclic Graph (DAG) T
(without increasing the size of N ), which will help us obtain
our price of anarchy bound. This is stated in the form of the
lemma below (We omit the proof due to space considerations).
Lemma 4.2: Resource graph N can be transformed into
expansion DAG T without affecting the equilibrium state S
and optimal congestion C∗, where |T | ≤ |N |.
Since T is a DAG we know that it has sink nodes (with
outdegree 0). Every node in V1 is an internal node (with non-
zero indegree and outdegree) since it has congestion > C∗ and
hence the sink nodes in T are nodes from V2. Consider the
DAG starting at the root node with congestion C. By applying
lemma 4.1 recursively to the root and its descendants in V1,
we count the number of nodes until we reach terminating sinks
in V2. Noting as before that each resource in T is counted at
most C∗ times in the lemma, we get the result
Lemma 4.3: For DAG T with root node r and congestion
Cr = C, it holds that∑
y∈Descendants(r)
⋂
V2
ψM ≥ C − C
∗
2C∗
CM
Theorem 4.4 (Price of Anarchy for Type-A players): The
upper bound on the price of anarchy is PoA = O(|R| 1M+1 ).
Proof: The number of descendants of r in T is at most
|R| − 1. Using the fact that ψ ≥ 3C∗ and substituting in
lemma 4.3, we get that
|R| − 1 ≥ (PoA− 1) · PoA
M
2 · 3M >
PoAM+1
4 · 3M
for any PoA > 2, and hence for the given constant M, we get
the desired result PoA = O(|R| 1M+1 ).
B. Price of Anarchy for Arbitrary Games
By Theorem 3.1, we only need to consider games in equilib-
rium with type-A players occupying resources with congestion
> ψ. By combining Theorem 3.1, Theorem 4.4, and Corollary
2.1 we obtain the main result for price of anarchy:
Theorem 4.5 (PoA for Arbitrary Polynomial Cost Games):
The upper bound on the price of anarchy for polynomial cost
games is O(|R| 1M+1 ).
V. LOWER BOUND
We show that the upper bound of O(|R|1/(M+1) in the price
of anarchy is tight by demonstrating a congestion game with
a lower bound on the price of anarchy of Ω(|R|1/(M+1)).
We construct a game instance represented as a graph in the
figure below, such that each edge in the graph corresponds
to a resource, and each player pii has two strategies avail-
able: either the path from u to v through the direct edge
e = (u, v), or an alternative path pi = (u, xi, . . . , yi, v) (note
that different player paths are edge-disjoint). Each path has
length |pi| = |R|M/(M+1) edges and the number of players is
n = |R|1/(M+1). (For simplicity assume that the values of |pi|
and n are integers, since if they are not we can always round
to the nearest ceiling.) The edge e is actually part of one the
paths; for ease of presentation, in the figure below the edge is
depicted as separate from the paths.
x1 y1
u v
xn yn
x2 y2
x1 y1
u v
xn yn
x2 y2
p1
pn
p2
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Let S be the state depicted on the left part of the figure,
where each player chooses the first strategy, and let S∗ be
the state on the right part of the figure, where each player
chooses the alternative path. We have that C(S∗) = 1, which
is the smallest congestion possible. Thus, S∗ represents a
socially optimal solution. For state S we have that C(S) = n,
since all players use edge (u, v). Note that S is a Nash
Equilibrium, since each player pii has cost pcpii(S) = nM =
|R|M/(M+1), and the cost of switching to path pi would be
1M · |pi| = |R|M/(M+1), which is the same at the cost of
using edge (u, v). Consequently, a lower bound on the price
of anarchy is C(S)/C(S∗) = n/1 = |R|1/(M+1). Therefore,
PoA = Ω(|R|1/(M+1)), as needed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have considered bottleneck congestion games with poly-
nomial cost functions and shown that the Price of Anarchy
is bounded by O(|R| 1M+1 ). This Price of Anarchy result is
optimal, as demonstrated by a game with this exact PoA. We
also demonstrate two novel techniques, B to A player con-
version and expansion which help us obtain this result. These
techniques which enable us to simplify games for analysis
are sufficiently general. In future work, we plan to use these
techniques to analyze the PoA of games with arbitrary player
cost functions.
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